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Abstract

Tennessee corn producers may experience increased income volatility due to
recent changes in federal government agricultural policies. Consequently, these farmers
need information about the expected value and variability of net revenues for alternative

crop insurance, futures hedging, and put option strategies to manage risk. The objectives
ofthis study were 1)to evaluate how traditional hedging strategies, existing crop
insurance programs, and new income protection strategies affect the expected value and

variability of net revenue for a com enterprise in West Tennessee; and 2)to identify from
the traditional and new income protection alternatives, the risk - preferred strategies for
different levels offarmer risk aversion behavior.

Stochastic simulation and stochastic dominance methods were used to achieve the

objectives ofthe study. Corn yields for Obion County, Tennessee and November cash

prices for the Northwest Tennessee market were randomly simulated along with fiatures
prices in November and February. Crop insurance strategies evaluated were Crop

Revenue Coverage(CRC), Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI), and Revenue
Assurance(RA)were evaluated in conjunction with futures hedges and put options.
Twenty simulations of 192 observations each were generated from random draws using a
lognormal distribution. The yield and price data used to specify the expected value,
variance, and covariance relationships in the model were for the 1988 through 1994 time

period. Premiums for the insurance products were quoted directly from private insurance
agents for the 1997 crop year. Fixed equipment and labor costs as well as variable and
overhead expenses for 1997 were also subtracted from the simulated gross revenue.
iv

The degree of accuracy for the simulated mean of net revenue as compared to the
expected mean of net revenue was calculated in the form of a confidence interval. The
simulated net revenue series for each income protection strategy was analyzed in terms of

the tradeoffs among expected net revenues, variance of net revenues, and minimum net
revenues averaged across twenty simulations. Probabilities of achieving various rates of

return on investment were evaluated for each alternative income protection strategy.
Simulated net revenue distributions(CDF's)for each strategy were analyzed using first-

degree stochastic dominance and second-degree stochastic dominance criteria.
The top five strategies in order of descending mean net revenue were;(1)futures
hedge on 100 percent ofthe historical yield average,(2)futures hedge on 50 percent of
the historical yield average(3)combination ofthe 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI
with 65% yield coverage at $2.45^ushel,(4)no crop insurance or futures hedging (cash
market), and (5)combination of 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI with 70 percent
coverage at $2.45/bushel. Producers interested in maximizing profit would not use crop

insurance. In general, none ofthe crop insurance or hedging strategies were very effective
in reducing the variability of net revenues and the relative riskiness when compared with
not using any yield or price protection. However, RA at the 75 percent coverage level
was the most effective strategy in setting a floor on the minimum value of net revenue. As

a consequence, extremely risk averse producers may prefer a RA strategy as a way to

manage income risk. Moreover, the cash market, RA, CRC, and MPCI strategies were

the most likely to cover all ofthe variable and fixed costs of production in the simulation.
The strategies most likely to be in the second-degree stochastic dominance efficient set

were:(1)the cash market strategy,(2)RA at the 75 percent coverage level,(3) 100

percent futures hedge on average production, and (4)50 percent futures hedge on average
production. These strategies are risk efficient for risk neutral and risk averse decision
makers.
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Part 1: Introduction

Introduction

The revenues that Tennessee farmers receive from the production offield crops are

risky due to uncertain weather impacts on yields and uncertain market impacts on prices.
Historically, producers have relied on the federal government to manage income risk

through a price support program. Under the government program, farmers would receive
a deficiency payment during periods when the market price fell below a specified target

price. This payment would help farmers manage the downside income risk associated with
adverse price movements. Producers were required under the program to restrict acreage
grown in order to receive the deficiency payment. With the passage ofthe Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR)Act of 1996, deficiency payments for many
crops were replaced by contract payments, and acreage reduction programs were
eliminated. Contract payments were set for fixed amounts through the year 2002 and are

not expected to change regardless offuture prices and yields(Young and Shields, 1996).
Now that these restrictions have been eliminated, farmers can grow what they think will be

the most profitable crop given their expectations of price and yield at planting time.
A related development affecting farmers is lower global stocks for the major

grains. Increased domestic consumption, higher exports from the United States, and less
forfeiture of crops into government stocks due to changes in government policy, caused

global stocks-to-use ratios for com and wheat in 1995-1996 to fall to the lowest level
since USDA began tracking stocks in 1960(Harwood et al, 1996). With lower stocks of

grain to help buffer yearly supply and demand shocks, many analysts believe there will be

increased price volatility in the future. Increased planting flexibility and lower global
stocks ofgrain may increase future income volatility for farmers unless a risk management
strategy is used in conjunction with market signals. The FAIR Act and previous farm bill
legislation have encouraged the development of alternative income protection strategies
for farmers. These risk management products were designed to help farmers manage yield
and price volatility in the absence of price support programs and acreage controls being
phased out under the FAIR Act. These insurance products are offered through private
insurance companies and are reinsured through the Federal Government. The products

being offered to farmers include Catastrophic Coverage(CAT), Multiple-Peril Crop
Insurance(MPCI), Group Risk Plan(GRP), Revenue Assurance(RA),Income Protection

(IP), and Crop Revenue Coverage(CRC). The intended purpose ofthese products are to
protect against low yields and/or low crop prices. Some ofthese products are currently
available in Tennessee and others are expected to be available in the future. The feasibility
ofinsurance alternatives in helping producers manage risk as measured by the expected
value and variability of net revenues has not been evaluated for Tennessee. Information

about the net revenue tradeoffs among traditional hedging strategies using futures and
options, existing crop insurance programs, and new income protection programs would be
useful in farm planning and decision making. Because these products are designed to

reduce variability ofincome, a farmer's risk attitude is an important factor that may

explain whether or not a specific income protection product is used. Farmers with
alternative risk attitudes may prefer different income protection products based on the
tradeoffs in expected value and variability of net revenues.

Objectives

The objectives ofthis study were; 1)to evaluate how traditional hedging
strategies, existing crop insurance programs, and selected new income protection

strategies affect the expected value and variability of net revenue for a representative crop
enterprise in West Tennessee; and 2)to identify from the traditional and new income
protection alternatives, the risk-preferred strategies for different levels offarmer risk
aversion behavior.

Representative Crop Situation

For the purpose of this analysis, the farm modeled in this study is a large,
commercial operation that obtains all ofit's income from farming activities. The specific
field crop scenario modeled is a 1,000 com enterprise in Obion County, Tennessee. Obion

County is in Northwest Tennessee and is located near the southern edge ofthe U.S. corn
belt. Approximately 10 percent ofthe 697 farms in Obion County had a farm size of more
than 1,000 acres in 1992(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureaus ofthe Census). The
reasons for using a com production scenario to analyze net revenues for alternative

income protection strategies are as follows. First, com is an important enterprise
altemative for farmers in northwest Tennessee. In 1997, Obion County was ranked
number one in com production in Tennessee with 69,000 acres planted (Tennessee

Department of Agriculture, 1998). In addition, information about crop insurance products

for com were readily available when compared with other crops grown in Tennessee.
Finally, a single commodity was evaluated to facilitate the modeling of alternative income
protection strategies. Potential correlations among alternative crops and commodity
prices were not considered in this analysis. Larger diversified crop farms may be able to
purchase crop insurance at a lower cost per acre than assumed in this analysis. On the
other hand, farms with smaller com acreage may incur slightly higher per acre costs to

purchase insurance coverage due to service and other fees that do not vary with acreage.
Modeling a single commodity such as com represents the worst case scenario in terms of
income risk.

Review of Previous Studies

Several researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of altemative income

protection strategies since the passage ofthe FAIR Act. Harwood, et al.(1996)
compared CRC,IP, MPCI, and forward contracting risk management strategies for com
producers in Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, and South Dakota. They ranked the risk

management altematives based on the probability ofrevenue falling below 70 percent of
an expected preplanting level. The results, from best to worst were IP and CRC followed

by a combination of crop insurance and forward contracting, crop insurance alone, and
forward contracting alone. However, the premiums to be charged to farmers were not
included in the revenue assessment and no weight was given to strategies that would have
resulted in higher probabilities of revenue above projected levels. Harwood, et al. also

analyzed data from the 1993 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and found that producers
\vith higher farm sales were less likely to obtain insurance and more likely to hedge
production.

Dhuyvetter and Kastens(1997)compared net revenues from no crop insurance
versus using CAT, MPCI, and CRC coverage options for a dryland Kansas wheat farm.

They also examined pre-harvest hedging strategies in conjunction with using insurance.
CRC produced the highest minimum net revenue value (maxi-min criterion) among the
alternatives analyzed. The maxi-min strategy is preferred by decision makers who are

extremely risk averse (Grub, 1986). The MPCI plan maximized the highest expected mean
net revenue among the alternatives. The strategy that maximizes expected net revenue is
preferred by risk neutral decision makers. Furthermore, Dhuyvetter and Kastens
observed that although the variability ofrevenues is generally lower \vith CRC than with

MPCI, the advantage of CRC over MPCI decreases as the amount of production hedged
increases.

Heifner and Coble(1997) used numerical integration to find the optimal futures

and options hedge ratios in conjunction with crop insurance and forward contracting for
com producers in Dewitt County, Illinois. The crop insurance strategies that they
evaluated were: 1) MPCI, 2)MPCI with replacement coverage, 3)IP, and 4)CRC. Their

model accounted for differences in yield-price correlation and yield variability in order to
apply their results over areas without a 'natural hedge' and/or high yield variability.
Furthermore, the gains in hedging effectiveness were normalized under four different

levels of risk aversion. Without forward pricing of production, IP and CRC were found to

be superior to MPCI in reducing risk over four combinations of yield-price correlation and
yield variability. With forward pricing of production, IP and CRC also outperformed
MPCI and provided protection to a farmer who has overcommited productions through
forward contracting.

Also available on the Chicago Board of Trade are new hedging tools such as com
yield insurance futures and options on com yield insurance futures for some states.
Miranda and Glauber stated that there is insufficient correlation between an individual

farm's yield and measurements of aggregate yields so that a futures contract or option on
a future contract based on aggregate yield shortfalls would offer adequate protection to

this same individual. However, Timpattur, Hauser, and Chaherli(1995)showed that crop
yield futures can be used in conjunction with price futures to derive risk management
benefits significantly higher than using either ofthe two alone. This was accomplished

using Iowa com and Illinois soybeans yield contracts as hedging altematives for producers
in Champaign County, Illinois. The following altematives were evaluated. 1) a no-hedge
scenario where revenue is determined by cash market prices and yields; 2) hedging using

both price and yield futures. 3)hedging using just price futures; 4) hedging using just
yield futures, 5) a no-hedge scenario where revenue is determined by the market and by
participating in the former deficiency payment program, 6)a no-hedge scenario where
revenue is determined by the market using Revenue Assurance at the 70 percent coverage
level. Price and yield futures hedge for corn were 50 percent ofthe average production
history for the com yield futures hedge and 70 percent of production history for the com

price futures hedge. The price and yield futures hedge for soybeans were 80 percent of

the production yield history for the soybeans yield futures hedge and 90 percent ofthe
production history for the soybean price futures hedge. The top three strategies evaluated
by the probability of revenue falling below a threshold gross revenue level of $95/acre

were: 1) a no-hedge scenario where revenue is determined by the market and by
participating in the former deficiency payment program, 2)hedging using both price and
yield futures, and 3)hedging using just price futures. The top three strategies in

minimizing variance of gross revenues were: 1) hedging using both price and yield
futures; 2) hedging using just price futures; and 3) a no-hedge scenario where revenue is

determined by the market and by participating in the former deficiency payment program.
Although, the mean for the Revenue Assurance strategy ranked second to the deficiency

payment strategy, it was also $1.34/acre higher than the strategies using both yield and
price futures. Grray et al. (1995) have shown that incomes could be stabilized and that
payments to producers would be substantially less under RA than under the former price
support programs.

Risk Management Strategies Evaluated

Farmers have a number oftraditional and new risk management alternatives they

can use to mitigate the effects of price and yield risk in the new environment. Doing

nothing to obtain downside protection is one strategy farmers can follow. In this case, the
producer would sell or store grain to sell at market prices. However, doing nothing may
not be an optimal strategy depending on a farmers risk attitude. Several strategies have
8

been or are currently being introduced that farmers can use to mitigate price and yield risk.

Futures market hedging provides a producer with the opportunity to "lock in" a price
before harvest through the use of commodity futures and options contracts. The ability to
lock in a price before harvest on a predetermined level of production allows a farmer to
develop a floor below which gross revenues cannot fall. A futures contract legally
obligates a holder to either deliver or accept delivery ofthe contracted commodity on or

by some specified date in the future (National Futures Association). Here the farmer must
make a financial commitment in the form of margin for futures contracts or premiums for

options. Futures contracts on com are for 5,000 bushels of no. 2 yellow com.
Traditionally, these contracts are used to hedge price risk. A com producer making
hedging decisions before planting will be interested in the basis, or the difference between
the local cash price and the futures contract price. This difference is mainly due to

transportation costs and time associated with shipping the com from one destination to
another.

A put option gives a producer the right to sell a specific futures contract at a
specific price, but does not obligate the producer to sell if it becomes advantageous to let
the put option expire. Buying put options provides a producer new possibilities in the use
offutures by eliminating margin calls and by making the maximum loss from using futures

equal to the initial option premium plus commission. The premium is "the market
determined value ofan option for a particular futures contract at a particular price level or

'strike price'"(National Futures Association). So, a $2.30 put option on the December
com contract will protect the producer from prices falling below $2.30 as the producer

could then sell his option contracts for a profit in the amount of($2.30 minus the market

price) times the number of bushels stated in the contract, typically 5,000. Futures and
options strategies will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
There are also a variety of products available from private insurance companies
but reinsured through the federal government such as; Catastrophic coverage(CAT),
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI), MPCI with replacement coverage. Group Risk
Plan(GRP), Revenue Assurance (RA), Income Protection (IP), Crop Revenue Coverage
(CRC), and Crop Revenue Coverage Plus(CRCPlus). In general, the purpose ofthese
products is to provide a floor beyond which gross revenues cannot fall. This is
accomplished by insuring levels of yield or gross revenue as a percentage ofthe
operation's last five years of data. If no yield or revenue data series is available the local

County average is used. Some ofthese products are currently available to a farmer
depending on the state, crop, and product.
CAT coverage pays on 50 percent of actual yield at 60 percent of expected market
price. MPCI coverage allows a producer to select a yield coverage level from 50 to 75
percent ofthe average from the last five years of historic yields. Whenever the harvested

yield falls below the preselected coverage limit, an indemnity is paid at a per bushel rate
set by the government. MPCI policies have been widely used in the recent past. The GRP

coverage differs in that the farmer's crop production history does not enter the picture.

When enrolling in this policy one will select a yield level and price for the county in which
one resides. Ifthe county average yield drops below the selected yield, an indemnity is

paid. IP combines yield and price protection by setting an income guarantee per acre

10

based on historic yields and projected prices at harvest. The CRC products differ from an

IP policy in that the producer will receive an indemnity calculated from either a base price
or a harvest price, whichever is higher. This base price and the harvest price are the
monthly moving averages for the daily settlement prices during the February and
November trading periods ofthe December Com futures contract respectively. As with
an Asian option, this allows a producer to take advantage ofan upside swing on the
market. The CRCPlus policy allows the insured to increase the base price. This gives
extra protection against a downside market swing. Along with GRP products, CRC is

relatively new and also maintains a significant market share. Under a RA policy, 65
percent to 75 percent of historical five year moving average revenue is guaranteed to the

producer. This product was originally proposed to be provided at low cost by the federal
government, but is currently offered through private insurance companies in some
locations.

This study will compare some ofthe alternatives available or expected to be

available to West Tennessee Com Producers, namely Multiple Peril Crop Insurance, Crop
Revenue Coverage, futures hedges, put options hedges, and Revenue Assurance.

11
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Part 2: Stochastic Simulation of Net Revenues for Alternative

Protection Strategies

Introduction

The revenues that Tennessee farmers receive from the production offield crops are
risky due to uncertain weather impacts on yields and uncertain market impacts on prices.

Historically, producers have relied on the federal government to manage income risk
through a price support program. Under the government program, farmers would receive

a deficiency payment during periods when the market price fell below a specified target
price. These payments would help farmers manage the downside income risk associated
with adverse price movements. Producers were required under the program to restrict
acreage grown in order to receive the deficiency pajment. With the passage ofthe Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR)Act of 1996, deficiency payments for many
crops were replaced by contract payments, and acreage reduction programs were
eliminated. Contract payments were set for fixed amounts through the year 2002 and are
not expected to change regardless offuture prices and yields(Young and Shields, 1996).

Now that these restrictions have been eliminated, farmers can grow what they think will be
the most profitable crop given their expectations of price and yield at planting time.
A related development affecting farmers is lower global stocks for the major
grains. Increased domestic consumption, higher exports from the United States due to
changes in government policy, and less forfeiture of crops into government stocks, caused

global stocks-to-use ratios for com and wheat in 1995-1996 to fall to the lowest level
since USDA began tracking stocks in 1960(Harwood et al., 1996). With lower stocks of

grain to help buffer yearly supply and demand shocks, many analysts believe there will be
15

increased price volatility in the future. The implications ofincreased planting flexibility
and lower global stocks of grains will most likely increase future income volatility for
farmers unless a risk management strategy is used in conjunction with market signals.
The FAIR Act and previous farm bill legislation have encouraged the development
of alternative income protection strategies for farmers. These risk management products
were designed to help farmers manage yield and price volatility in the absence of price
support programs and acreage controls being phased out under the FAIR Act. These
insurance products are offered through private insurance companies and are reinsured
through the Federal Government. Some ofthese products are currently available in
Tennessee and others are expected to be available in the future. The effectiveness ofthese

insurance products in managing risk as measured by the expected value and variability of
net revenues has not been evaluated for Tennessee farmers. Information about the net

revenue trade offs among traditional hedging strategies using futures and options, existing
crop insurance programs, and new income protection programs would be useful for farm
planning and decision making. The objective of this study was to evaluate the expected
value and variability of net revenues from alternative income protection strategies for a
representative field crop in West Tennessee.

Representative Farm Situation

For the purpose ofthis analysis, the farm modeled in this study was a large,
commercial operation that obtains all ofit's income from farming activities. The specific

16

field crop scenario modeled is a 1,000 acre com enterprise in Obion County, Tennessee.

Obion County is in northwest Tennessee and is located near the southem edge ofthe U.S.
Com Belt. Approximately 10 percent ofthe 697 farms in Obion County had a farm size of
more than 1,000 acres in 1992(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureaus ofthe Census).
The reasons for using a com production scenario to analyze net revenues for altemative
income protection strategies are as follows. First, com is an important enterprise
altemative for farmers in northwest Tennessee. In 1997, Obion County was ranked
number one in com production in Tennessee with 69,000 acres planted (Tennessee
Department of Agriculture, 1998). In addition, com is grown in nearly every County in
Tennessee. Finally, a single commodity was evaluated to facilitate the modeling of

altemative income protection strategies. Potential correlations among altemative crops
and commodity prices were not considered in this analysis. Indeed, crop diversification is
a risk reduction strategy upon which crop insurance can be purchased at a lower cost per
acre than assumed in this analysis. By modeling only a single commodity, the actual risk
incurred is representative ofthe worst case scenario for a producer.

Review of Literature

Several researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of altemative income

protection strategies in mitigating risk in a post FAIR Act environment. Harwood, et al.
(1996)compared Crop Revenue Coverage(CRC),Income Protection (IP), Multiple Peril
Crop Insurance(MPCI), and forward contracting risk management strategies for com
17

producers in Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, and South Dakota. They ranked the risk
management alternatives based on the probability ofrevenue falling below 70 percent of

an expected preplanting level. The results, from best to worst were IP, CRC, a
combination ofcrop insurance and forward contracting, crop insurance alone, and forward
contracting alone. However, premiums were not included in the revenue assessment and
no weight was given to strategies that would have resulted in higher probabilities of

revenue above projected levels. Harwood, et al. also analyzed data from the 1993 Farm
Costs and Returns Survey and found that producers with higher farm sales were less likely
to obtain insurance and more likely to hedge production.
Dhuyvetter and Kastens(1997)compared net revenues from no crop insurance

versus using CAT, MPCI, and CRC coverage options for a dryland Kansas wheat farm.
They also examined pre-harvest hedging strategies in conjunction with using crop

insurance. CRC produced the highest minimum net revenue value (maxi-min criterion)
among the alternatives analyzed. The maxi-min strategy is preferred by decision makers

who are extremely risk averse(Grub, 1986). The MPCI plan maximized the expected net
revenue among the alternatives. The strategy that maximizes expected net revenue is
preferred by risk neutral decision makers. Furthermore, Dhuyvetter and Kastens
observed that although the variability ofrevenues is generally lower with CRC than with

MPCI, the advantage of CRC over MPCI decreases as the amount of production hedged
increases.

Heifner and Coble(1997)used numerical integration to find the optimal price

futures and options hedge ratios in conjunction with crop insurance and forward
18

contracting for com producers in Dewitt County, Illinois. The crop insurance strategies
that they evaluated were: 1)MPCI,2) NIPCI with replacement coverage, 3)IP, and 4)
CRC. Their model accounted for differences in yield-price correlation and yield variability

in order to apply their results over areas without a 'natural hedge' and/or high yield
variability. Furthermore, the gains in hedging effectiveness were normalized under four
different levels of risk aversion. Without forward pricing of production, IP and CRC were
found to be superior to MPCI in reducing risk over four combinations of yield-price
correlation and yield variability. With forward pricing of production, IP and CRC also

outperformed MPCI and provided protection to a producer who has overcommited
production through forward contracting. Gray et al.(1995) have shown that incomes
could be stabilized and that payments to producers would be substantially less with
Revenue Assurance(RA)than undSr the former price support programs.

Methods and Data

Simulation and enterprise budgeting methods were used to achieve the objectives
ofthis study. Trapp defines simulation as "the process of numerically solving a
computerized mathematical model in an attempt to reproduce the actual essential elements

of an operating system (p.130)." Simulation facilitates experimentation with alternative
income protection strategies and the evaluation oftradeoffs in the expected value and

variability of net revenues among strategies. This section describes the simulation model,
the data used in the model, and the hedging and insurance strategies simulated with the
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model.

Simulation Model

The farm decision maker was assumed to make planting hedging and crop

insurance decisions in February. The com crop was assumed to be harvested and sold in
November. For the futures hedge, the producer was assumed to sell a December com

futures contract in February and buy back the December futures contract in November.
For the put option strategy, the producer was assumed to purchase a put option on the
December com contract in February and not exercise the option contract until the com

was sold in November. Ifthe option premium did not have a positive value at harvest it

was allowed to expire. Indemnity payments from crop insurance strategies were
determined in November after the crop was harvested and sold. Net revenue(NR)for a

farmer producing com, hedging with futures and options, and purchasing crop insurance
can be written as:

(1)

NR = P^Y + HR-HC + ID-IC-OC,

where P is the cash price for com ($/bushel), Y is the yield ofcom (lb/acre); HR is the

revenue from pre-harvest hedging activities with futures or options ($/acre);ID is the

indemnity payment received from crop insurance activities ($/acre); HC is the cost of
hedging activities;IC is the premiums paid for crop insurance coverage ($/acre); and OC
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is the estimated variable expenses, fixed equipment and labor costs, and overhead
expenses that do not change with the hedging or insurance strategies ($/acre). This

residual(NR)is the estimated return to a fanner for land, management and risk (Boehlje
and Eidman, 1984). HR for the futures strategy was determined by the difference between
futures contract prices in February and November and the basis, or the difference between
the November futures and cash prices. This difference was multiplied by the bushels of

production hedged. For the options strategy, HR was determined by multiplying the
bushels of production hedged by the premium value ofthe option in November. HC for
the futures hedge included commission expenses and taxes and interest costs on initial

margin. ID is the payout made by the insurance company for a specified com yield and/or
com price selection or for a specified level of gross revenue coverage.
To calculate Stochastic NR's for the production, hedging, and crop insurance

activities represented in equation (1), the five random values simulated were: 1) harvested
com yield, 2)the November cash com price for Obion County, 3)the February futures
price for the Chicago Board of Trade(CBOT)December com contract, 4)the February
put option premiums for the CBOT December Com contract, and 5)the December futures
price for the Chicago Board of Trade(CBOT)December corn contract. To simulate
random values for the production, hedging, and insurance activities in equation (1), five
random, correlated variates were generated as follows:

(2)

D=^E + A*R,

where D is a 5x1 vector of random values, E is a 5x1 vector of expected values. A* is a
5x5 matrix of coefficients, and R is a 5x1 vector oflognormally distributed random
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deviates. A lognormal distribution was assumed to preclude negative yields or commodity
prices. A* in equation (2)is an upper triangular matrix of coefficients derived from the
estimated variance-covariance matrix ofthe five yield and price random variables
(Clements, Mapp, and Eidman; Fishman).
Yield and price data reported in Table 1 were used to estimate expected (mean)
values and variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model. Obion County com

yields(1988-1996) were from Tennessee Agriculture (Tennessee Department of
Agriculture). Northwest Tennessee November average cash market prices used to
represent Obion County prices were from Tennessee Market Highlights(Tennessee

Department of Agriculture). February and November averages for the December Com
contract were computed using data from the Chicago Board of Trade. Evaluations ofthe
data for an inflationary trend in prices and upward trends in yields due to changes in
technology were found to not be statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The
1995 cash price of $3.26/bushel was deemed to be an outlier that would bias upward the
probability of a high com price received by farmers and may overstate variability of net
revenue experienced by farmers. Consequently, the 1988-94 portion ofthe time-series in
Table 1 was used to estimate coefficients for this simulation model. Removing the 199596 years reduced the variability in gross revenue by approximately 50 percent.

To develop put option premiums for the simulation model, the November average

futures price on the December contract was regressed on the February futures price on the
December contract;

(3)

FPf^QY = «() +(ttj X FPp^g)+ £;,
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where FPf^^y and FPp^g are the November and February futures prices for the CBOT

December com contract,

and a, are the estimated regression coefficients, and 8; is the

regression residuals. The residuals were used to calculate

for inclusion as a stochastic

variable in the Cholesky decomposition in A*. The residuals and November futures price
from the random variants were used to infer a futures price in February by solving
equation(3)for the Febmary futures price as follows:

(4)

Inferred FP^eb = l/aj x FPj^ov «o "

•

Finally, the option price ofthe December contract at the end ofFebmary was derived by
regressing the price ofthe option(OP)on the inferred Febmary futures price.
(5)

OP = P 0 +(Pi X InferredFPpeb) +tOi.
The $2.30 strike price and the 1988-94 time period were chosen due to data

availability. The data from the CBOT lists final daily settlements for strike prices of S2.10
and $2.30 for each ofthe years in the 1988-1994 time series. One limitation of this

method is that option prices for the $2.30 strike were extremely "in the money" for many
years ofthe time series. The result of which is expensive option premiums for the
purchaser. This assumption ofthe options strategy fails to account for the value ofthe
early exercise feature that is built into the option premium.
The estimated variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model is

presented in Table 2. The negative correlation of-0.8138 between yields and prices at
harvest is indicative ofthe basic supply and demand relationship. Ehgher yields and
production tend to produce lower prices. The correlation of.96065 between the TN cash

and Futures in November is extremely high due to competitive markets. The correlation

23

coefficients of-0.7548 and -0.8138 display typical yield/price relationships with the
November Futures and local prices respectively. The correlations of-0.7132, and -0.7849

between February futures and November prices in Tennessee and Chicago respectively are
indicative ofthe relationship between storage costs and normal seasonal market trends. In
other words, the November prices will be lower than in February during a normal
marketing year due to a surplus at harvest.

Strategies Simulated

The 26 hedging and insurance strategies simulated with the model are outlined in

Table 3. The per acre costs for each income protection strategy simulated are also in

Table 3. The cash market strategy assumes that the farmer does not hedge against price
risk, does not purchase insurance, and sells production on the cash market. The coverage
levels for Revenue Assurance(RA), CRC, and MPCI insurance products modeled were
65,70, and 75 percent.

Currently, RA is not available in Tennessee. Consequently, premiums for RA in

Obion County were determined in the following manner. Market quotes for Clay County,
Iowa were obtained from the Deanna Orwig Agency (Personal communication with

Deanna Orwig, Insurance Agent, Spencer, lA February, 1998)for RA and CRC products.
County-level yields for 1977 to 1997 were compared between Obion County TN and Clay
County lA (Tennessee Department of Agriculture; Iowa Department of Agriculture). The

coefficient of variation(CV)was calculated to estimate relative yield variability for each of
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the two counties'. The CV for Obion County was 23.1 compared with 17.3 for Clay
County. It was assumed that the higher cost ofthe CRC products in Tennessee compared
with Iowa is due to the higher yield variability as opposed to higher administrative costs
for selling a product to a smaller customer base in Tennessee than in Iowa. Therefore, RA
premiums were determined using a relative as opposed to an absolute difference in

premiums for CRC and RA products. For each level of coverage, the Obion County RA
premium was determined by dividing the RA premium by the CRC premium for Clay
County, lA, and multiplying the resulting ratio by the Obion County CRC premiums
quoted from the Jarmon Insurance Agency in Alexandria Indiana (Personal communication

with Jerry Jarmon, Insurance agent, Alexandria, IN, September, 1997)^. Although the
aforementioned procedure calculates a close approximation for West Tennessee RA
premiums, it is by no means exact. Therefore, RA premiums were also modeled at 75 and

125 percent ofthe previously determined RA premiums for each level of coverage.^
MPCI strategies modeled were 65, 70, and 75 percent ofthe 5-year average of
Obion county com yields. MPCI polices can be purchased at varying indemnity rates for
the 70 and 75% yield selections. MPCI policies were modeled at the five levels of

subsidized yield coverage and indemnity payment rates: 65 percent of yield at $2.60 per

'Coefficient of variation = standard deviation

mean x 100.

^ RA,65 percent level = S2.92/acre $8.49/acre x $12.93/acre = S4.45/acre
RA, 70 percent level = $5.45/acre $12.45/acre x $18.52/acre = $8.25/acre
RA,70 percent level = $8.42/acre ^ $18.07/acre x $26.69/acre = $12.44/acre

^ RA,65 percent level = $4.45/acre x .75 = $3.34/acre; $4.45/acre x 1.25 = $5.56/acre
RA, 70 percent level = $8.25/acre x .75 = $6.19/acre; S8.25/acre x 1.25 = $10.31/acre
RA, 75 percent level = $12.44/acre x .75 = $9.33/acre; S12.44/acre x 1.25 = $15.55/acre
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bushel, 70 percent at $2.60 per bushel, 70 percent at $2.42 per bushel, 75 percent at $2.60
per bushel, 75 percent at $2.26 per bushel, respectively. An Administrative fee of$10 per
policy was prorated over the 1,000 acre enterprise in addition to premium amounts.
MPCI premiums were also quoted from the Jarmon Insurance Agency (Personal
communication with Jerry Jarmon, Insurance agent, Alexandria, IN, September, 1997).

The management alternatives involving the use of options contracts were limited to
two routine hedging strategies on 100 percent(100% options) and 50 percent(50%
options) ofthe historical average yield of 116 bushels per acre via the purchase of a $2.30
put option. Round turn commissions and taxes of$50.00 and $1.72, respectively were
also subtracted from gross income for each option and future contract purchased
(Personal communication with Charlie Crawford, senior broker, Parker Grain Brokerage,

Knoxville, TN,December 1997).
Hedging with futures contracts was considered both alone and in combination with
MPCI to cover both price and yield risk. Future hedges were placed on 100 percent

(100% futures hedge) and 50 percent(50% futures hedge)ofthe historical average yield.
Interest on margin deposits was calculated at an 11 percent annual rate for eight months of
the year. This interest was applied to 5 percent of the initial February futures price times
the number of contracts purchased (National Futures Association). Interest charges on

margin calls due to fluctuations in the futures price before harvest were ignored in the
analysis.

The other costs of production in equation(1)that were subtracted from revenues
when estimating net revenues were from Gerloff and Maxey(1997). These costs include
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machinery, labor, and materials expenses to produce an acre ofcom using 8-row
equipment. The total variable expenses, fixed equipment and labor costs, and overhead
expenses used in the simulation totaled $170.40 per acre.

Simulation Analysis

The steps to analyze the output from the simulation model are as follows. First, a

procedure suggested by Cambell, Lo, and MacKinlay(1997) was used to evaluate the
accuracy ofthe model in simulating Obion County com net revenues. Next, the simulated

output for each income protection strategy was analyzed in terms of evaluating the
tradeoffs among expected net revenues, variance of net revenues, and minimum net
revenues. Finally, the probability of achieving various rates ofretum on investment was

evaluated for altemative income protection strategies. Each ofthese steps is described in
this section.

Cambell, Lo, and MacKinlay(1997) state that a confidence interval for a
simulation run ofn observations can be constructed in the following manner:

(6)

pr

H{0) - \.96^<H{(y)<H{0) + 1.96-"^'^

yfn)

= 0.95,

where H(0) is the sample mean of net revenue from the n- observation simulation run,
1.96 is the Z-value for the two-tailed t-test at the 95 percent probability level, o^r is the
sample standard deviation from then- observation simulation run, and H(0) is the true
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mean net revenue taken from the original data points. The following relationship from

equation(6)was used to evaluate simulation accuracy for an n- observation simulation run
using the cash market strategy:

(7)

SA = 1.96

^NR

fn

The larger the value ofn, the tighter the simulated confidence interval is around the true
expected net revenue and the higher the degree of accuracy. For a given value ofn, there
exists a 95 percent probability that the true mean net revenue will fall within the simulated
confidence interval on each of20 simulation runs that were conducted.

The probability of achieving zero, five, and 10 percent simple rates ofreturn on
investment in land, buildings, and equipment for corn production was evaluated. To
estimate the probabilities, the number oftimes that simulated NR exceeds the value ofland
buildings and equipment by specified dollar amounts that will generate the specific rates of

return was calculated for each strategy. The estimated per acre value ofland, buildings,

and equipment in Obion county used to calculate the dollar amount was $1,447.^ The net
revenue dollar amounts that are required to achieve simple rates of return ofzero, five,
and 10 percent on the 1.447 million investment are $0, $72,358, and $144,716.

'Obion County land, buildings, and equipment value of$1,072 /acre in 1992(US.
Department of Commerce, Bureau ofthe Census). The $1,072 was indexed to a 1996
value using a factor of 1.35 representing the increase in Tennessee average farm land
values between 1992 and 1996(Tennessee Department of Agriculture).
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Results and Discussion

Model Evaluation

Net revenue statistics for the 26 strategies simulated are presented in table 4. The
number of observations simulated for each strategy within a run was 192. The cash
market strategy was used to evaluate the accuracy ofthe model. The simulated mean and
standard deviation of net revenues for the cash strategy were $97,626 and $37,717,
respectively. The actual mean and standard deviation of net revenues from the 1988

through 1994 data series for Obion County were $96,676 and $31,521. Hence, the

calculated degree of simulation accuracy using equation (7)and averaged across 20
simulation runs is $5,335. Consequently, the average 95 percent confidence interval for

the cash market strategy is $92,291 ^ H(0) < $102,961. The simulated cash strategy net
revenue of$97,626 falls within this interval suggesting the model is accurate at the 95
percent confidence level.

To evaluate the futures hedging strategy performance in the model, the simulated
basis was compared with the actual basis for the 1984 to 1994 period. The difference
between the November futures and northwest Tennessee cash price averaged
$0.057/bushel across twenty simulation runs. The simulated basis is similar to the

$0.064^ushel for the original data points. The standard deviation ofthe simulated basis is
$0.15/bushel, which is twice the standard deviation of$0.07^ushel in the original data
points. The actual basis and the simulated basis were more variable than cash market
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prices for the period. The coefficient of variation for cash price v^^as 10.07 compared with
102.46 for the actual basis and 234.38 for the simulated basis. The high variability in the
basis for this period may cause the hedging strategy to not perform well as a risk reduction
strategy in the simulation.

Net Revenue Evaluation

The top five strategies in order of descending mean net revenues are; (1)

futures hedge on 100 percent ofthe historical yield average,(2)futures hedge on 50
percent ofthe historical yield average,(3)combination ofthe 100 percent futures hedge
and multiple peril crop insurance(MPCI)with 65 percent yield coverage at $2.45/bushel,

(4)cash market, and (5)combination ofthe 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI with 70
percent coverage at $2.45/ bushel. The futures hedge on 100 percent ofthe historical
yield average produced mean net revenue of $101,501, compared with $97,626 for the
cash market strategy. However, the standard deviation of net revenue for the futures
hedging strategy was $67,289, nearly double the $37,717 standard deviation ofthe cash

market strategy. A textbook futures hedge involves a tradeoff oflower expected net
revenue for a smaller variance of net revenue for a risk averse decision maker. The

reasons for the higher mean and standard deviation of net revenues for the futures hedge

in the model are as follows. First, the amount of total production hedged may be too high
for a producer interested in reducing price risk. Second, the basis relation in the model is
more variable than cash market prices causing more variability in net revenues from
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futures hedges. Because both yields and prices are stochastic in the model, the hedging
strategy in some years is speculative v/hen simulated production is less than the 120,000
bushel amount hedged on the futures market. For example, yield that is two standard
deviations below the mean of 116 bushels/acre is 72 bushels/acre and results in a 48,000
bushel production shortfall under this hedging scenario. If the cost of buying back the
com in November is greater than what it has sold for in Febmary on the futures market,
the farmer takes a direct loss on the 48,000 bushel shortfall. On the other hand, if

production is above average, and if the cost of buying com on the futures market is less in
November than in Febmary, the profit from hedging is higher than in the cash market.
Farmers who are risk neutral would prefer the futures hedge on 100 percent ofthe
historical yield average over all other income protection strategies under the price and
yield scenario modeled. Farmers who are risk averse are interested in strategies involving
tradeoffs of mean net revenue for lower variance of net revenues. Producers who are

extremely risk averse prefer strategies that maximize the minimum revenue(maximin
strategy). The top five strategies in minimizing variance of net revenues were altemative
crop insurance strategies:(1) CRC,75 percent coverage;(2)MPCI, 75 percent yield
coverage at $2.45/bushel;(3)MPCI, 75 percent yield coverage at $2.13/bushel;(4) CRC,
65 percent coverage; and (5)MPCI, 70 percent coverage at $2.45/bushel. For CRC with

75 percent coverage, mean net revenue of$72,512 was reduced 26 percent less than the

cash market strategy while the $35,511 standard deviation of net revenue was only 6
percent lower than the cash strategy. In terms of relative risk as measured by the
coefficient of variation, the cash strategy was less risky(CV=38.6)than the CRC strategy
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(CV=48.9). In general, none ofthe crop insurance or hedging strategies markedly
reduced variability of net revenue and relative riskiness when compared with the cash
strategy.

The top five strategies that maximized the minimum net revenue (maximin
criterion) are:(1)Revenue Assurance, 75% coverage,(2) Revenue Assurance, 70%

coverage,(3)cash market prices,(4)Revenue Assurance 65% coverage,(5) Crop
Revenue Coverage 75% coverage. The actual yield and price data used to make the

simulation model operational did not contain extremely low values. This may partially
explain the appearance ofthe cash market strategy in the above. Revenue Assurance
strategies were the most effective at setting a floor on net revenues with minimum values
ranging from $18,118 to $24,338 for 75 percent coverage. These minimum net revenues
compare with $9,964 for the cash market strategy. As a result. Revenue Assurance

products may perform well for extremely risk averse producers. However, RA strategies
did not significantly lower the standard deviation of net revenues, but did lower mean net

revenues by three to 15 percent depending on the coverage and premium level.
Consequently, the relative riskiness ofRA strategies was higher than the cash strategy
with coefficient of variations ranging from 41.5 to 44.6 depending on the coverage and
premium level.

The probabilities of achieving alternative rates ofreturn above variable and fixed
cost and the specified return to land and equipment are in Table 5. At the zero percent
rate of return level, RA, CRC, and MPCI strategies did not affect the probability of
covering the variable and fixed costs of production. Combining futures hedging with
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MPCI reduced the probability of covering variable and fixed costs from one to eight
percent when compared with the cash market strategy. The cash market and futures

hedge on 50% ofthe historical yield average provided the highest probability of73
percent in achieving at least a five percent rate of return on investment. At the ten percent
rate ofreturn level, the ICQ percent futures hedge on the historical yield average provided
the highest probability of31 percent in achieving that return. MPCI combined \vith

fiatures hedging also provided a high probability of achieving a 10 percent rate ofreturn,
ranging from a 11 to 26 percent probability. The options strategies modeled performed
worst. One reason for this is that option prices for a $2.30 put were very "in the money"
during many years from the original data.

Summary and Conclusions

This study evaluated the expected value and variability of net revenues for

alternative income protection strategies for a large corn enterprise located in Northwest
Tennessee. A simulation model was developed to generate the randomly correlated draws
from which net revenues were then calculated for each strategy. The following criteria
were used to evaluate net revenues: the expected value of net revenues, the variance of net
revenues, the minimum value of net revenues, and the rates of return and investment in

land, buildings, and equipment for com production.

The top five strategies in order of descending mean net revenue were;(1)futures
hedge on 100 percent ofthe historical yield average,(2)futures hedge on 50 percent of
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the historical yield average(3)combination of the 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI

with 65% yield coverage at $2.45/bushel,(4) no crop insurance or futures hedging (cash
market), and (5)combination of 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI with 70 percent
coverage at $2.45/bushel. Producers interested in maximizing profit would not use crop

insurance. In general, none ofthe crop insurance or hedging strategies were very effective
in reducing the variability of net revenues and the relative riskiness when compared with

not using any yield or price protection. However, RA at the 75 percent coverage level
was the most effective strategy in setting a floor on the minimum value of net revenue.
Moreover, the cash market, RA, CRC, and MPCI strategies were the most likely to cover
all ofthe variable and fixed costs of production in the simulation.
Further research should be conducted in the area of analyzing multiple crops (e.g.

com and soybeans)for West Tennessee farms. Due to inherent correlations among price
and yield with a multiple crop study, the results would be more applicable to those same
farmers. Also, the Group Risk Plan(GRP)is now widely available and should be studied
in conjunction with other strategies.
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Appendix

Table 1. Obion County corn yields and market prices used to estimate expected
values and the variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model
Year

Com yield^

November

November

Febmary

(lb/acre)

Northwest

futures price on

futures Price on

Tennessee cash

the December

the December

corn contract"

com contract"

($^ushel)

($/bushel)

($/bushel)

market price''

1988

110

2.57

2.69

2.17

1989

128

2.40

2.38

2.71

1990

111

2.29

2.26

2.47

1991

90

2.39

2.43

2.59

1992

147

1.96

2.12

2.70

1993

91

2.66

2.74

2.40

1994

136

2.06

2.16

2.68

1995

147

3.26

3.28

2.57

1996

134

2.66

2.68

3.08

Average,

116

2.33

2.40

2.53

1988-94

Sources:

Tennessee Deparment of Agriculture. Tennessee Agriculture. 1988-96

Annual Issues. Tennessee Agricultural Statistics Service, Nashville, TN;''Agricultural

Extension Service. Tennessee Market Highlights. November 1988-96 monthly issues;

"Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago, Illinois 1988-96.
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Table 2. The estimated variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model
Item

Com

Northwest

November

February

yield

Tennessee

futures

futures

February
options

cash price

Com yield^

Cash price''
November

477.8

-3.86898

-17327

10569

-1.4842

(-0.8138)''

(-0.7548)

(0.5622)

(-0.5278)

0.06439

255.98

-155.65

0.023086

(0.96065)

(-0.7132)

(0.70722)

-827060

109.57

1500954

futures

(-0.7849)

Februap'

1006821

(0.69525)
-13.259

futures

(-0.1027)

Option

0.0271

pnce

Sources:

Tennessee Deparment of Agriculture. Tennessee Agriculture. 1988-96

Annual Issues. Tennessee Agricultural Statistics Service, Nashville, IN;''Agricultural

Extension Service. Tennessee Market Highlights. November 1988-96 monthly issues;

'^Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago, Illinois 1988-96.
The correlation coefficient is in parenthesis
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Table 3. Alternative income protection strategies simulated in the analysis

Strategy

Cost /Acre (Dollars)

Cash Market

0.00

Revenue Assurance

65% coverage

4.45 (X 75% = 3.34, x 125% = 5.56)

70% coverage

8.25 (X 75%= 6.19, x 125%= 10.31)

75% coverage

12.44(X 75% = 9.33, x 125% = 15.55)

Crop Revenue Coverage,
65% coverage

12.93

70% coverage

18.52

75% coverage

26.69

Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCl),
75% Yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

17.27''

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

20.83"

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

12.37"

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

13.78"

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

8.89"

50% Futures hedge and MPCl
75% yield coverage at $2.13 / bu

-

U

17.27 +$0.62/acre + margin

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

20.83"+ $0.62/acre''+ margin
12.37"+ $0.62/acre'^ + margin
13.78" + $0.62/acre'^ + margin
8.89" + $0.62/acre^ + margin

100% Futures hedge and MPCl
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

17.27 +$1.24/acre + margin

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

«

U

50% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

20.83"+ $1.24/acre''+ margin
12.37"+ $1.24/acre^ + margin
13.78" +$1.24/acre^ + margin
8.89" +$1.24/acre^ + margin
$1.24/acre''+ margin
$0.62/acre^ + margin

100% options hedge on the historical yield average

$1.24/acre^

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
100% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

$0.62/acre''
50% options hedge on the historical yield average
® Includes $10 service charge prorated over 1,000 acres
Commissions and tax of$51.72 per contract times the number of contracts purchased divided by
1,000 acres. The number of contracts purchased for 100 and 50 percent of the historical yield
average were 24 and 12,respectively.
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Table 4. Simulated net revenue statistics averaged over 20 simulations (Dollars)
Strategy

Standard

Means

Maximum

Minimum

Skewness

deviation
Cash Market

97626

37717

210155

9964

0.27

Revenue Assurance,
65% coverage

93186

37702

205705

7376

0.27

65% coverage at 75% of premium

94296

37702

206815

8486

0.27

65% coverage at 125% of premium

92076

37702

204595

6266

0.27

89466

37437

201905

12500

0.30

70% coverage at 75% of premium

91526

37437

203965

14560

0.30

70% coverage at 125% of premium

87406

37437

199845

10440

0.30

Revenue Assurance,
70% coverage

Revenue Assurance,
75% coverage

86054

37008

197715

21228

0.37

75% coverage at 75% of premium

89164

37008

200825

24338

0.37

75% coverage at 125% of premium

82944

37008

194605

18118

0.37

Crop Revenue Coverage,
65% coverage

84865

37411

197225

3976

0.31

70% coverage

79686

36779

191635

4347

0.38

75% coverage

72512

35511

183465

6126

0.49

Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI)
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

81428

36247

184935

2234

0.41

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

78030

36075

189325

-891

0.42

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

85708

37015

197785

4440

0.35

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

84331

36971

196375

3204

0.35

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

88865

56551

201265

3867

0.30

50% Futures hedge and MPCI

75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

87748

46911

217965

-8894

0.28

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

84348

46668

214405

-10601

0.30

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

92026

47907

222865

-12543

0.20

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

90649

47849

221445

-13243

0.20

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

95183

48499

226345

-17333

0.14

100% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

94065

65425

272904

-62684

0.14

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

90666

65171

269344

-63552

0.15

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

98344

66430

277804

-66981

0.08

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

96968

66370

276394

-67606

0.09

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

281284

-70532

0.05

101501

67015

100% Futures hedge on the historical yield

110262

67289

290174

-67471

0.03

50% Futures hedge on the historical yield

103944

48775

235235

-16661

0.11

100% options hedge on the historical yield

-32909

134619

146613

-821754

-2.57

50% options hedge on the historical yield

32359

77398

175143

-379754

-1.86
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Table 5. Probability of achieving alternative rates of return on investment in corn
production*
Strategy

0 percent

5 percent

10 percent

Cash Market

100

73

11

65% coverage

100

68

9

70% coverage

100

65

8

75% coverage

100

61

6

100

61

6

70% coverage

100

55

5

75% coverage

100

47

3

100

57

5

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

100

53

4

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

100

62

6

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

100

60

5

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

100

65

8

50% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13 / bu

99

61

12

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

98

58

11

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

98

65

14

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

98

64

14

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

98

68

16

100% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

92

62

22

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

92

60

21

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

93

66

25

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

92

64

24

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

93

67

26

100% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

95

72

31

50% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

99

73

20

100% options hedge on the historical yield average

52

10

0

50% options hedge on the historical yield average

77

30

2

Revenue Assurance,

Crop Revenue Coverage,
65% coverage

Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI),
75% Yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu

* Above variable and fixed costs of production and the specified return to land and
equipment of0, 5, or 10 percent.
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Part 3: Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Net Revenues for Alternative
Protection Strategies

Introduction

The revenues that Tennessee farmers receive from the production of field crops are
risky due to uncertain weather impacts on yields and uncertain market impacts on prices.
Historically, producers have relied on the federal government to manage income risk

through a price support program. Under the government program, farmers would receive
a deficiency payment during periods when the market price fell below a specified target
price. These payments would help farmers manage the downside income risk associated

with adverse price movements. Producers were required under the program to restrict
acreage grown in order to receive the deficiency payment. With the passage ofthe Federal

Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR)Act of 1996, deficiency payments for many
crops were replaced by contract payments, and acreage reduction programs were

eliminated. Contract payments were set for fixed amounts through the year 2002 and are
not expected to change regardless offuture prices and yields(Young and Shields, 1996).
Now that these restrictions have been eliminated, farmers can grow what they think will be
the most profitable crop given their expectations of price and yield at planting time.
A related development affecting farmers is lower global stocks for the major
grains. Increased domestic consumption, higher exports from the United States due to

changes in government policy, and less forfeiture of crops into government stocks, caused
global stocks-to-use ratios for com and wheat in 1995-1996 to fall to the lowest level

since USDA began tracking stocks in 1960(Harwood et al., 1996). With lower stocks of
grain to help buffer yearly supply and demand shocks, many analysts believe there will be
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increased price volatility in the future. The implications of increased planting flexibility
and recent global trends will most likely increase future income volatility for farmers
unless a risk management strategy is used in conjunction with market signals.
The FAIR Act and previous farm bill legislation have encouraged the development

of alternative income protection strategies for farmers. These risk management products
were designed to help farmers manage yield and price volatility in the absence of price
support programs and acreage controls being phased out under the FAIR Act. These
insurance products are offered through private insurance companies and are reinsured

through the Federal Government. Some ofthese products are currently available in
Tennessee and others are expected to be available in the future. The effectiveness ofthese

insurance products in managing risk as measured by the expected value and variability of
net revenues has not been evaluated for Tennessee farmers. Information about the net

revenue trade offs among traditional hedging strategies using futures and options, existing
crop insurance programs, and new income protection programs would be useful for farm
planning and decision making.

Because these products are designed to reduce variability of income, a farmer's

risk attitude is an important factor that may explain whether or not a specific income
protection product is used. Farmers with alternative risk attitudes may prefer different

income protection products based on the tradeoffs in expected value and variability of net
revenues. The objective of this study was to identify from the traditional and new income

protection alternatives, the risk-preferred strategies for a representative row crop for
different levels offarmer risk aversion behavior.
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Representative Farm Situation

For the purpose ofthis analysis, the farm modeled in this study was a large,
commercial operation that obtains all of it's income from farming activities. The specific
field crop scenario modeled is a 1,000 acre corn enterprise in Obion County, Tennessee.
Obion County is in northwest Tennessee and is located near the southern edge of the U.S.
Corn Belt. Approximately 10 percent ofthe 697 farms in Obion County had a farm size of
more than 1,000 acres in 1992(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureaus of the Census).
The reasons for using a com production scenario to analyze net revenues for alternative

income protection strategies are as follows. First, corn is an important enterprise
alternative for farmers in northwest Tennessee. In 1997, Obion County was ranked
number one in com production in Tennessee with 69,000 acres planted (Tennessee

Department of Agriculture, 1998). In addition, corn is grown in nearly every County in
Tennessee. Finally, a single commodity was evaluated to facilitate the modeling of

altemative income protection strategies. Potential correlations among alternative crops
and commodity prices were not considered in this analysis. Indeed, crop diversification is
a risk reduction strategy upon which crop insurance can be purchased at a lower cost per
acre than assumed in this analysis. By modeling only a single commodity, the actual risk

incurred is representative ofthe worst case scenario for a producer.
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Review of Literature

Several researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of alternative income

protection strategies in mitigating risk in a post FAIR Act environment. Harwood, et al.
(1996) compared Crop Revenue Coverage(CRC), Income Protection (IP), Multiple Peril
Crop Insurance(MPCI), and forward contracting risk management strategies for corn
producers in Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, and South Dakota. They ranked the risk
management alternatives based on the probability of revenue falling below 70 percent of
an expected preplanting level. The results, from best to worst were IP and CRC followed
by a combination of crop insurance and forward contracting, crop insurance alone, and
forward contracting alone. However, premiums were not included in the revenue
assessment and no weight was given to strategies that would have resulted in higher

probabilities of revenue above projected levels. Harwood, et al. also analyzed data from
the 1993 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and found that producers with higher farm sales
were less likely to obtain insurance and more likely to hedge production.
Dhuyvetter and Kastens(1997) compared net revenues from no crop insurance

versus using CAT, MPCI, and CRC coverage options for a dryland Kansas wheat farm.
They also examined pre-harvest hedging strategies in conjunction with using insurance.

CRC produced the highest minimum net revenue value (maxi-min criterion) among the
alternatives analyzed. The maxi-min strategy is preferred by decision makers who are

extremely risk averse (Grub, 1986). The MPCI plan maximized expected net revenue
among the alternatives. The strategy that maximizes expected net revenue is preferred by
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risk neutral decision makers. Furthermore, Dhuyvetter and Kastens observed that
although the variability of revenues is generally lower with CRC than with MPCI, the
advantage of CRC over MPCI decreases as the amount of production hedged increases.

Heifner and Coble(1997) used numerical integration to find the optimal price
futures and options hedge ratios in conjunction with crop insurance and forward
contracting for com producers in Dewitt County, Illinois. The crop insurance strategies
that they evaluated were: 1) MPCI,2)MPCI with replacement coverage, 3)IP, and 4)
CRC. Their model accounted for differences in yield-price correlation and yield variability
in order to apply their results over areas without a 'natural hedge' and/or high yield

variability. Furthermore, the gains in hedging effectiveness were normalized under four
different levels of risk aversion. Without forward pricing of production, IP and CRC were

found to be superior to MPCI in reducing risk over four combinations of yield-price
correlation and yield variability. With forward pricing of production, IP and CRC also
outperformed MPCI and provided protection to a producer who has overcommited
production through forward contracting. Gray et al. (1995) have shown that incomes
could be stabilized and that payments to producers would be substantially less under
Revenue Assurance(RA)than under the former price support programs.

Methods and Data

Monte Carlo simulation and stochastic dominance methods were used to achieve

the objectives of this study. Compared to other procedures, Monte Carlo simulation is
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numerically efficient when there are several variables. This is because the time taken to
carry out a Monte Carlo simulation increases approximately linearly with the number of

variables, whereas the time taken for most other procedures increases exponentially with
the number of variables. Stochastic dominance procedures facilitate the evaluation of

tradeoffs in the expected value and variability of net revenues among income protection
strategies for risk averse farmers. The first part ofthis section presents the simulation
model followed by the yield, price, and cost data used in the model. Next, is a
presentation ofthe hedging and insurance strategies simulated with the model. The final

part ofthis section is a description of stochastic dominance methods used to analyze the
simulated net revenues.

Simulation Model

The farm decision maker was assumed to make planting hedging and crop
insurance decisions in February. The corn crop was assumed to be harvested and sold in
November. For the futures hedge, the producer was assumed to sell a December corn
futures contract in February and buy back the December futures contract in November.

For the put option strategy, the producer was assumed to purchase a put option on the
December com contract in February and not exercise the option contract until the corn

was sold in November. If the option premium did not have a positive value at harvest it
was allowed to expire. Indemnity payments from crop insurance strategies were

determined in November after the crop was harvested and sold. Net revenue(NR)for a
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farmer producing corn, hedging with futures and options, and purchasing crop insurance
can be written as:

(1)

NR^P^Y+HR-HC + ID-IC-OC,

where P is the cash price for com ($^ushel), Y is the yield of corn (lb/acre); HR is the
revenue from pre-harvest hedging activities with futures or options ($/acre); ID is the

indemnity payment received from crop insurance activities ($/acre); HC is the cost of
hedging activities;IC is the premiums paid for crop insurance coverage ($/acre); and OC
is the estimated variable expenses, fixed equipment and labor costs, and overhead

expenses that do not change with the hedging or insurance strategies ($/acre). This

residual(NR)is the estimated return to a farmer for land, management and risk (Boehlje
and Eidman, 1984). HR for the futures strategy was determined by the difference between
futures contract prices in Febmary and November and the basis, or the difference between

the November futures and cash prices. This difference was multiplied by the bushels of

production hedged. For the options strategy, HR was determined by multiplying the
bushels of production hedged by the premium value of the option in November. HC for
the futures hedge included commission expenses and taxes and interest costs on initial
margin. ID is the payout made by the insurance company for a specified corn yield and/or

com price selection or for a specified level of gross revenue coverage.
To calculate stochastic

'5 for the production, hedging, and crop insurance

activities represented in equation (1), the five random values simulated were: 1) harvested
corn yield, 2)the November cash corn price for Obion County, 3) the February futures
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price for the Chicago Board of Trade(CBOT)December corn contract, 4)the February
put option premiums for the CBOT December Corn contract, and 5)the December futures
price for the Chicago Board of Trade(CBOT)December corn contract. The five random
correlated variates were generated as follows:
(2)

D = E + A*R,

where D is a 5x 1 vector of random values, E is a 5x 1 vector of expected values. A* is a
5x5 matrix of coefficients, and R is a 5x1 vector of lognormally distributed random
deviates. A lognormal distribution was assumed to preclude negative yields or commodity
prices. A* in equation (2)is an upper triangular matrix of coefficients derived from the

estimated variance-covariance matrix of the five yield and price random variables
(Clements, Mapp, and Eidman; Fishman).
Yield and price data reported in Table 1 were used to estimate expected (mean)
values and variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model. Obion County corn

yields(1988-1996) were from Tennessee Agriadlnre (Tennessee Department of
Agriculture). Northwest Tennessee November average cash market prices used to
represent Obion county prices were from Tennessee Market Highlights(Tennessee
Department of Agriculture). February and November averages for the December Corn
contract were computed using data from the Chicago Board of Trade. Evaluations ofthe
data for an inflationary trend in prices and upward trends in yields due to changes in

technology were found to not be statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The
1995 cash price of$3.26/bushel was deemed to be an outlier that would bias upward the

probability of a high corn price received by farmers and may overstate variability of net
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revenue experienced by farmers. Consequently, the 1988-94 portion of the time-series in
Table 1 was used to estimate coefficients for this simulation model. Removing the 199596 years reduced the variability in gross revenue by approximately 50 percent.
To develop put option premiums for the simulation model, the November average
futures price on the December contract was regressed on the February average futures

price on the December contract;
0)

PPnOV ~ Cq

(^1 ^ P^PpEb)

>

where FPfjQy and FPpgg are the November and February futures prices for the CBOT
December com contract,

and

are the estimated regression coefficients, and 8; is the

regression residuals. The residuals were used to calculate

for inclusion as a stochastic

variable in the Cholesky decomposition in A*. The residuals and November futures price
from the random variants were used to infer a futures price in February by solving
equation (3)for the February futures price as follows:

(4)

Inferred FPpgg = l/aj x

- Kq - 8; .

Finally, the option price ofthe December contract at the end of February was derived by
regressing the price of the option(OP)on the inferred February futures price.

(5)

OP = P 0 +(Pi X Marred FPpgg) +0)^ .

The $2.30 strike price and the 1984-94 time period were chosen due to data availability.

The data from the CBOT lists final daily settlements for strike prices of $2.10 and $2.30
for each ofthe years in the 1988-1994 time series. One limitation of this method is that

option prices for the $2.30 strike were extremely "in the money" for many years of the
time series. The result of which is expensive option premiums for the purchaser. Another
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assumption of the options strategy is that the producer purchases the option on March 1
and holds it until the end ofNovember without using the early exercise feature
characteristic of American options. This assumption of the options strategy fails to

account for the value ofthe early exercise feature that is built into the option premium.

The estimated variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model are presented in
Table 2.

Strategies Simulated

The 26 hedging and insurance strategies simulated with the model are outlined in

Table 3. The per acre costs for each income protection strategy simulated are also in
Table 3. The cash market strategy assumes that the farmer does not hedge against price

risk, does not purchase insurance, and sells production on the cash market. The coverage
levels for Revenue Assurance(RA), CRC, and MPCI insurance products modeled were
65,70, and 75 percent coverage.
Currently, RA is not available in Tennessee. Consequently, premiums for RA in
Obion County were determined in the following manner. Market quotes for RA and CRC
products in Clay County, Iowa were obtained from the Deanna Orwig Agency (Personal

communication with Deanna Orwig, Insurance Agent, Spencer, lA, February, 1998).
County-level yields for 1977 to 1997 were compared between Obion County TN and Clay
County lA (Tennessee Department of Agriculture; Iowa Department of Agriculture). The

coefficient of variation(CV)was calculated to estimate relative yield variability for each of
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the two counties.^ The CV for Obion County was 23.1 compared with 17.3 for Clay
County. It was assumed that the higher costs ofthe CRC products in Tennessee
compared with Iowa are due to the higher yield variability as opposed to higher
administrative costs for selling a product to a smaller customer base in Tennessee than in

Iowa. Therefore, RA premiums were determined using a relative as opposed to an
absolute difference in premiums for CRC and RA products. For each level of coverage,
the Obion County RA premium was determined by dividing the RA premium by the CRC

premium for Clay County, lA, and multiplying the resulting ratio by the Obion County
CRC premiums quoted from the Jarmon Insurance Agency (Personal communication with

Jerry Jarmon, Insurance agent, Alexandria, IN, September, 1997)1 Although the
aforementioned procedure calculates a close approximation for West Tennessee RA
premiums, it is by no means exact. Therefore, RA premiums were also modeled at 75 and

125 percent of the previously determined RA premiums for each level of coverage.^
MPCI strategies modeled were 65, 70, and 75 percent of the 5-year average of
Obion county corn yields. MPCI polices can be purchased at varying indemnity rates for
the 70 and 75% yield selections. MPCI policies were modeled at the five levels of
subsidized yield coverage and indemnity payment rates: 65 percent of yield at $2.60 per

'Coefficient of variation = standard deviation -i- mean x 100.

^ RA,65 percent level = S2.92/acre ^ S8.49/acre x $12.93/acre = $4.45/acre
RA, 70 percent level = $5.45/acre -i- $12.45/acre x $18.52/acre = $8.25/acre
RA, 70 percent level = S8.42/acre $18.07/acre x $26.69/acre = $12.44/acre

^RA, 65 percent level = S4.45/acre x .75 = $3.34/acre; $4.45/acre x 1.25 = $5.56/acre
RA, 70 percent level = $8.25/acre x .75 = $6.19/acre; $8.25/acre x 1.25 = $10.31/acre
RA, 75 percent level = $12.44/acre x .75 = $9.33/acre; $12.44/acre x 1.25 = $15.55/acre
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bushel, 70 percent at $2.60 per bushel, 70 percent at $2.42 per bushel, 75 percent at $2.60

per bushel, 75 percent at $2.26 per bushel, respectively. An administrative fee of$10 per
policy was prorated over the 1,000 acre enterprise in addition to premium amounts.
MPCI premiums were also quoted from the Jarmon Insurance Agency (Personal

communication with Jerry Jarmon, Insurance agent, Alexandria, IN, September, 1997).
The management alternatives involving the use of options contracts were limited to

two routine hedging strategies on 100 percent(100% options) and 50 percent(50%
options) ofthe historical average yield of 116 bushels per acre via the purchase of a $2.30
put option. Round turn commissions and taxes of$50.00 and $1.72, respectively were
also subtracted from gross income for each option and future contract purchased

(Personal communication vvnth Charlie Crawford, senior broker, Parker Grain Brokerage,
Knoxville, TN,December 1997).
Hedging with futures contracts was considered both alone and in combination with

MPCI. Future hedges were placed on 100 percent(100% futures hedge) and 50 percent
(50% futures hedge) ofthe historical average yield. Interest on margin deposits was
calculated at an 11 percent annual rate for eight months ofthe year. This interest was
applied to 5 percent ofthe initial February futures price times the number of contracts

purchased (National Futures Association). Interest charges on margin calls due to

fluctuations in the futures price before harvest were ignored in the analysis.
The other costs of production in equation (1)that were subtracted from revenues

when estimating net revenues were from Gerloff and Maxey(1997). These costs include

machinery, labor, and materials expenses to produce an acre ofcom using 8-row
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equipment. The total variable expenses, fixed equipment and labor costs, and overhead
expenses used in the simulation totaled $170.40 per acre.

Stochastic Dominance Analysis

The stochastic dominance procedure is based on the theory of expected utility and

involves a pair-wise comparison of expected utilities derived by decision makers from a set
of risky net revenues(King and Robison, 1984). For example, take a person who displays

utility for income(x) defined by the monotonically increasing function u{x). This person
must decide between two risky sets of net revenues, Aj and Aj, with cumulative outcome

probability distribution functions(CDFs)represented by G(x), and F(x), respectively.
When the expected utility of F(x) is greater than the expected utility of G(x), then Aj
stochastically dominates Aj and is preferred by that person. Using this pair-wise

comparison procedure, stochastic dominance provides an ordering of choices by placing
them into two mutually exclusive sets; the risk efficient set and the risk inefficient set.
Alternatives in the efficient set will always provide higher expected utilities than ones in
the inefficient set regardless of one's attitude towards risk.
Farmer's risk attitudes that can be modeled using alternative stochastic dominance

criteria fall into three general categories: risk averse, risk neutral, and risk seeking

behaviors(King and Robison, 1984). For risk averse farmers, their utility increases with
net revenue but at a decreasing rate, i.e., w'(x)> 0 and «"(x) < 0. By definition, a risk

averter would be willing to accept a slightly lower mean net revenue in exchange for a
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significantly less variable (risky) distribution of net revenues. If u'(x)>0 and u"(x)= 0,
utility increases at a constant rate as net revenue increases and the individual is said to be
risk neutral. These persons will only consider expected (mean) net revenue when ranking

alternatives. For risk seeking behavior, m'(x)> 0 and w"(x)> 0, utility increases at an
increasing rate as net revenue increases. A risk seeker could be willing to accept lower
mean net revenue in exchange for a riskier distribution of net revenue-especially
distributions that have one or more very large net revenue values.
The two stochastic dominance criteria used to examine the net revenues for

alternative income protection strategies are first-degree stochastic dominance(FSD)and
second-degree stochastic dominance(SSD). FSD imposes the single restriction, w'(x)>
0, on decision maker preferences regardless of one's risk attitude. At all levels of
cumulative probability, a strategy in the FSD set produces net revenue equal to or greater
than net revenue from a strategy in the inefficient set. In graphical terms, the two
cumulative outcome probability distribution functions(CDFs)represented by G(jc), and
F(x)for the two risky sets of net revenues Aj and A2, respectively could never cross.
However, in empirical analysis many distributions will cross each other and cannot be

ranked using the FSD criterion. It is therefore necessary to seek a more restrictive
concept of efficiency so that one can judge between risky prospects any time there is a
chance that one alternative is not 100 percent sure to be superior. This problem is
addressed by second degree stochastic dominance(SSD).
The SSD criterion was developed by Hadar and Russell(1969) and Hanoch and

Levy(1969) as a means of predicting a decision maker's choice between given pairs of
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risky alternatives without having any knowledge of a decision maker's utility function
other than it is monotonically increasing and strictly concave (the decision maker is risk

averse). In graphical terms, the two cumulative outcome probability distribution functions
(CDFs) represented by G(x), and F(x)for the two risky sets of net revenues Aj and Aj,
respectively can cross and still be ranked using the SSD criterion. Like FSD, SSD will
include the maximin and expected net revenue maximizing strategies. In this study, a
computer program by Cochran and Raskin was used to evaluate strategies for 20
simulation runs based on FSD and SSD criterion.

Results and Discussion

Net revenue statistics for the 26 strategies simulated are presented in table 4. The

top five strategies in order of descending mean net revenues are: (1)futures hedge on 100

percent ofthe historical yield average,(2)futures hedge on 50 percent ofthe historical
yield average,(3) combination ofthe 100 percent futures hedge and multiple peril crop
insurance(MPCI)with 65 percent yield coverage at $2.45^ushel,(4)cash market, and (5)
combination ofthe 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI with 70 percent coverage at
$2.45/ bushel. The futures hedge on 100 percent ofthe historical yield average produced

mean net revenue of$101,501, compared with $97,626 for the cash market strategy.
However, the standard deviation of net revenue for the futures hedging strategy was

$67,289, nearly double the $37,717 standard deviation ofthe cash market strategy. A
textbook futures hedge usually involves a tradeoff oflower expected net revenue for a
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smaller variance of net revenue for a risk averse decision maker. The possible reasons for
the higher mean and standard deviation of net revenues for the futures hedge in the model
are as follows. First, the amount of total production hedged may be too high for a
producer interested in reducing price risk. Second, the simulated basis in the model is
more variable than cash prices, which may make the hedging strategies not effective in

reducing income variability for this analysis. Because both yields and prices are stochastic
in the model, the hedging strategy in some years is speculative when simulated production
is less than the 120,000 bushel amount hedged on the futures market. For example, yield
that is two standard deviations below the mean of 116 bushels/acre is 72 bushels/acre and

results in a 48,000 bushel production shortfall under this hedging scenario. If the cost of
buying back the com in November is greater than what it has sold for in Febmary, on the
futures market, the farmer takes a direct loss on the 48,000 bushel shortfall. On the other

hand, if production is above average, and ifthe cost of buying com on the futures market
is less in November than in Februaiy, the profit from hedging is higher than in the cash
market.

The top five strategies in minimizing variance of net revenues were altemative crop

insurance strategies:(1)CRC,75 percent coverage;(2)MPCI, 75 percent yield coverage
at $2.45/bushel;(3)MPCI, 75 percent yield coverage at $2.13/bushel;(4) CRC,65

percent coverage; and (5) MPCI, 70 percent coverage at $2.45/bushel. For CRC with 75

percent coverage, mean net revenue of$72,512 was 26 percent less than the cash market
strategy while the $35,511 standard deviation of net revenue was only 6 percent lower
than the cash strategy. In terms of relative risk as measured by the coefficient of variation,
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the cash strategy was less risky(CV=38.6)than the CRC strategy(CV=48.9). In general,
none ofthe crop insurance or hedging strategies markedly reduced variability of net
revenue and relative riskiness when compared with the cash strategy.

The top five strategies that maximized the minimum net revenue (maximin
criterion) are:(1)Revenue Assurance, 75 percent coverage,(2)Revenue Assurance, 70
percent coverage,(3)cash market,(4)Revenue Assurance 65 percent coverage,(5)Crop
Revenue Coverage 75 percent coverage. The actual yield and price data used to make the
simulation model operational did not contain extremely low values. This may partially

explain the appearance ofthe cash market strategy in the above. Revenue Assurance
strategies were the most effective at setting a floor on net revenues with minimum values

ranging from $18,118 to $24,338 for 75 percent coverage. These minimum net revenues
compare with $9,964 for the cash market strategy. As a result, Revenue Assurance
products may perform well for extremely risk averse producers. This is because RA
strategies provided the largest minimum net revenues in the simulation. However, RA

strategies did not significantly lower the standard deviation of net revenues, but did lower
mean net revenues by three to 15 percent depending on the coverage and premium level.
Consequently, the relative riskiness ofRA strategies was higher than the cash strategy
with coefficient of variations ranging from 41.5 to 44.6 depending on the coverage and
premium level.

The stochastic dominance results are listed in Table 5. Three strategies were in the
risk efficient set for both the first- and second-degree stochastic dominance criteria on all

20 simulation runs: (1)cash market,(2) 100 percent futures hedge, and (3)50 percent
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futures hedge. These three strategies would be preferred by decision makers who are risk
averse. However, in terms ofthe level of risk aversion, it is likely that the futures hedging
strategies would be preferred by individuals who are risk neutral or slightly risk averse.
The cash market strategy would likely be preferred by individuals who have a higher
degree of risk averse behavior. The next best strategies in terms ofthe number oftimes
that they appeared in the FSD efficient set were: (1)a combination ofthe 100 percent

futures hedge and multiple peril crop insurance(MPCI)with 75 percent yield coverage at
$2.13/bushel and (2)Revenue Assurance, 75 percent coverage at 75 percent of premium.
Each ofthese strategies appeared in the FSD efficient set in 13 out ofthe 20 simulation

runs. Under the second-degree stochastic dominance criterion, the next best strategies in
terms ofthe number of times that they appeared in the SSD efficient set were: (1)
Revenue Assurance, 75 percent coverage at 75 percent of premium and (2)Revenue

Assurance, 75 percent coverage at 100 percent ofthe premium. These two RA strategies

appeared in the SSD efficient 13 and seven times, respectively, out of20 simulations.
Besides the top three strategies of Cash Market and Futures hedges, only the
Revenue Assurance strategies appeared in the SSD efficient set more than once out of20
simulations. Furthermore, the Revenue Assurance strategies were in the second-degree
stochastic dominance efficient set in every trial for which they also appeared in the first-

degree stochastic dominance efficient set. This result was far different than the case for
strategies using a combination offutures hedges with MPCI at 75 percent coverage at
$2.13/ bu and 70 percent yield coverage at $2.28/ bu. These strategies appeared in the

first-degree stochastic dominance efficient set more than any other strategies but failed to
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appear in the second-degree stochastic dominance efficient set. Among the crop insurance

strategies evaluated, RA appears to have the greatest potential to be a risk preferred
strategy for decision makers who have a higher degree of risk averse behavior. RA
produced the highest minimum net revenues in the simulation but did not markedly affect
the variance of net revenues. Finally, the in the money put options strategy simulated in
this analysis was not risk efficient for any class of decision makers.

Summary and Conclusions

This study evaluated the problem of selecting risk efficient income protection

strategies for a large com enterprise located in Northwest Tennessee. A simulation model
was developed to generate the randomly correlated draws from which net revenues were
then calculated for alternative crop insurance and price hedging strategies. First-degree
stochastic dominance and second-degree stochastic dominance criteria were used to
evaluate net revenues simulated for each alternative.

In the simulation, the traditional hedge of a short futures position maximized
expected net revenue but also increased the variability of net revenues. The unstable
futures basis relation in the data used in the simulation model and the large amount of

production hedged may have contributed to increased variability of net revenues.

Consequently, the futures hedging strategies were risk efficient for risk neutral and slightly
risk averse decision makers. For a decision maker with a higher degree of risk averse

behavior, the cash market and Revenue Assurance strategies may be the dominant
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strategies. Revenue Assurance at the 70 and 75 percent coverage levels were superior in
setting a floor on minimum net revenues. As a result, Revenue Assurance may be
preferred by extremely risk averse decision makers. While the Revenue Assurance

strategies were able to maximize-minimum net revenue, they did not appreciably lower
the variability of net revenues in the simulation.
Further research should be conducted in the area of analyzing multiple crops(e.g.

com and soybeans)for West Tennessee farms. Due to inherent correlations among price
and yield with a multiple crop study, the results would be more applicable to those same
farmers. Also, the Group Risk Plan(OR?)is now widely available and should be studied
in conjunction with other strategies.
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Appendix

Table 1. Obion County corn yields and market prices used to estimate expected
values and the variance-covariance coeflficients for the simulation model
Year

Com yield^

November

November

February

(lb/acre)

Northwest

futures price on

futures Price on

Tennessee cash

the December

the December

com contract"

com contract"

($^ushel)

($/bushel)

($/bushei)

market price''

1988

110

2.57

2.69

2.17

1989

128

2.40

2.38

2.71

1990

111

2.29

2.26

2.47

1991

90

2.39

2.43

2.59

1992

147

1.96

2.12

2.70

1993

91

2.66

2.74

2.40

1994

136

2.06

2.16

2.68

1995

147

3.26

3.28

2.57

1996

134

2.66

2.68

3.08

Average,

116

2.33

2.40

2.53

1988-94

Sources: ^ Tennessee Deparment of Agriculture. Tennessee Agriculture. 1988-96

Annual Issues. Teiuiessee Agricultural Statistics Service, Nashville, TN;''Agricultural

Extension Service. Tennessee Market Highlights. November 1988-96 monthly issues;

"Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago, Illinois 1988-96.
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Table 2. The estimated variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model
Com

Item

yield

Northwest

November

February

Tennessee

futures

futures

February
options

cash price

Com yield^

Cash price^
November

477.8

-3.86898

(-0.8138)'^
0.06439

-17327

(-0.7548)

10569

(0.5622)

-1.4842

(-0.5278)

255.98

-155.65

0.023086

(0.96065)

(-0.7132)

(0.70722)

1500954

-827060

109.57

futures

(-0.7849)

(0.69525)

Febmapf

1006821

-13.259

futures

(-0.1027)

Option
price

0.0271

Sources:

Tennessee Deparment of Agriculture. Tennessee Agriculture. 1988-96

Annual Issues. Tennessee Agricultural Statistics Service, Nashville, TN;^Agricultural

Extension Service. Tennessee Market Highlights. November 1988-96 monthly issues;

'^Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago, Illinois 1988-96.
The correlation coefficient is in parenthesis
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Table 3. Alternative income protection strategies simulated in the analysis

Strategy

Cost /Acre (Dollars)

Cash Market

0.00

Revenue Assurance

65% coverage

4.45(X 75% = 3.34, x 125% = 5.56)

70% coverage

8.25 (X 75%= 6.19, x 125%= 10.31)

75% coverage

12.44(X 75%= 9.33, x 125%= 15.55)

Crop Revenue Coverage,
65% coverage

12.93

70% coverage

18.52

75% coverage

26.69

Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI),
75% Yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

17.27^

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

20.83^

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

12.37^

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

13.78®

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

8.89®

50% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13 / bu

17.27® + $0.62/acre''+ margin
20.83® + $0.62/acre^ + margin
12.37® + $0.62/acre^ + margin
13.78® + $0.62/acre^ + margin
8.89® + $0.62/acre^ + margin

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
100% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13 / bu

50% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

17.27^ + $1.24/acre'^ + margin
20.83^ +$1.24/acre^ + margin
12.37^ + $1.24/acre''+ margin
13.78^ +$1.24/acre^ + margin
8.89^ +$1.24/acre^ + margin
$1.24/acre^ + margin
$0.62/acre^ + margin

100% options hedge on the historical yield average

$1.24/acre^

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
100% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

$0.62/acre''
50% options hedge on the historical yield average
^ Includes $10 service charge prorated over 1,000 acres

^ Commissions and tax of$51.72 per contract times the number of contracts purchased divided by
1,000 acres. The number of contracts purchased for 100 and 50 percent of the historical yield
average were 24 and 12, respectively.
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Table 4. Simulated net revenue statistics averaged over 20 simulations (Dollars)
Strategy

Standard

Means

Maximum

Minimum

Skewness

deviation
Cash Market

97626

37717

210155

9964

0.27

65% coverage

93186

37702

205705

7376

0.27

65% coverage at 75% of premium

94296

37702

206815

8486

0.27

65% coverage at 125% of premium

92076

37702

204595

6266

0.27

89466

37437

201905

12500

0.30

70% coverage at 75% of premium

91526

37437

203965

14560

0.30

70% coverage at 125% of premium

87406

37437

199845

10440

0.30

Revenue Assurance,

Revenue Assurance,
70% coverage

Revenue Assurance,
75% coverage

86054

37008

197715

21228

0.37

75% coverage at 75% of premium

89164

37008

200825

24338

0.37

75% coverage at 125% of premium

82944

37008

194605

18118

0.37

84865

37411

197225

3976

0.31

70% coverage

79686

36779

191635

4347

0.38

75% coverage

72512

3551 1

183465

6126

0.49

Crop Revenue Coverage,
65% coverage

Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI)
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

81428

36247

184935

2234

0.41

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

78030

36075

189325

-891

0.42

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

85708

37015

197785

4440

0.35

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

84331

36971

196375

3204

0.35

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

88865

56551

201265

3867

0.30

87748

46911

217965

-8894

0.28

50% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

84348

46668

214405

-10601

0.30

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

92026

47907

222865

-12543

0.20

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

90649

47849

221445

-13243

0.20

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

95183

48499

226345

-17333

0.14

94065

65425

272904

-62684

0.14

100% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu
75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

90666

65171

269344

-63552

0.15

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

98344

66430

277804

-66981

0.08

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

96968

66370

276394

-67606

0.09

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

101501

67015

281284

-70532

0.05

100% Futures hedge on the historical yield

110262

67289

290174

-67471

0.03

50% Futures hedge on the historical yield

103944

48775

235235

-16661

0.11

100% options hedge on the historical yield

-32909

134619

146613

-821754

-2.57

50% options hedge on the historical yield

32359

77398

175143

-379754

-1.86
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Table 5. Number of times strategies appeared in efficient sets out of twenty simulations
Strategy

First Degree Stochastic

Second Degree Stochastic

Dominance

Dominance

20

20

65 percent coverage

1

1

65% coverage at 75% of premium

1

1

65% coverage at 125% of premium

1

1

70% coverage

5

5

70% coverage at 75% of premium

5

5

70% coverage at 125% of premium

4

4

75% coverage

7

7

75% coverage at 75% of premium

13

13

75% coverage at 125% of premium

4

4

0

0

70% coverage

0

0

75% coverage

0

0

0

0

0

0

Cash Market

Revenue Assurance,

Revenue Assurance,

Revenue Assurance,

Crop Revenue Coverage,
65% coverage

Multiple Peril Crop Insurance(MPCI)
75% yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu
75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu
70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

1

1

0

0

65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

0

0

12

0

75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

1

0

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

11

0

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu

1

0

6

1

50% Futures hedge and MPCI

75% yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu

100% Futures hedge and MPCI
75% yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu

13

0

75% yield coverage at $2,45 / bu

5

0

70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu

11

0

70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu
100% Futures hedge on the historical yield average

5

0

7

1

20

20

50% Futures hedge on the historical yield average
100% options hedge hedge on the historical yield average

20

20

0

0

50% options hedge hedge on the historical yield average

0

0
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Part 4: Summary

Summary
Among the crop insurance and hedging strategies simulated, the top five strategies
in order of descending mean net revenue were:(1)fiatures hedge on 100 percent ofthe
historical yield average,(2)futures hedge on 50 percent ofthe historical yield average(3)
combination ofthe 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI with 65% yield coverage at
$2.45/bushel,(4) no crop insurance or futures hedging (cash market), and (5)combination
of 100 percent futures hedge and MPCI with 70 percent coverage at $2.45/bushel.
Producers interested in maximizing profit would not use crop insurance. In general, none

ofthe crop insurance or hedging strategies were very effective in reducing the variability
of net revenues and the relative riskiness when compared with not using any yield or price

protection. However, RA at the 75 percent coverage level was the most effective strategy
in setting a floor on the minimum value of net revenue. As a consequence, extremely risk
averse producers may prefer a RA strategy as a way to manage income risk. Moreover,

the cash market, RA, CRC, and MPCI strategies were the most likely to cover all ofthe
variable and fixed costs of production in the simulation. The strategies most likely to be in
the second-degree stochastic dominance efficient set were:(1)the cash market strategy,
(2)RA at the 75 percent coverage level,(3) 100 percent futures hedge on average
production, and (4)50 percent futures hedge on average production. These strategies are
risk efficient for risk neutral and risk averse decision makers.
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